University of Pennsylvania

ScholarlyCommons
Penn IUR Publications

Penn Institute for Urban Research

July 2006

A Brief History of Race and the Supreme Court
David Kairys
Temple University

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/penniur_papers

Kairys, David, "A Brief History of Race and the Supreme Court" (2006). Penn IUR Publications. 17.
https://repository.upenn.edu/penniur_papers/17

Copyright 2006 by David Kairys.
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/penniur_papers/17
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.

A Brief History of Race and the Supreme Court
Abstract
This essay, based on a lecture sponsored by the Penn Institute for Urban Research, presents a brief
history of the Supreme Court on race issues, from the Marshall Court to the present, beginning by
focusing on Brown v. Board of Education and the development in the mid-1970s of a narrow purposeful
discrimination rule that has made it near impossible for minority claims of discrimination to succeed.
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A Brief History of Race and the Supreme Court
by David Kairys ∗
I sometimes begin presentations on the history of the Supreme Court on race
issues by asking the audience or class to react to the names of two Supreme Court cases.
I ask them to notice the associations they make with each case, and then to volunteer
reactions of a few words.1
The first case: Brown v. Board of Education . . . . 2
Here are some of the regular reactions: Ajustice,@ Aequality,@ Afreedom,@ Ait was
about time.@ Some reactions are stronger and deeper B Arule of law at it=s best,@ Atriumph
∗ James E. Beasley Professor of Law, Beasley School of Law, Temple University. This essay is
based on a lecture on March 29, 2006 sponsored by the Penn Institute for Urban Research at the
University of Pennsylvania. I appreciate the invitation from Susan Wachter and Eugenia Birch, Codirectors of the Institute, Elijah Anderson, and Richard Gelles, and the contribution of the discussant,
Thomas Sugrue. Footnotes have been added mainly for citations referenced in the text and for my earlier
works that elaborate on issues addressed in the essay. Copyright 8 2006 by David Kairys.
1 This essay is partially drawn from my works in the area: More or Less Equal, 13 Temple
Political and Civil Rights L. Rev. 675 (2005), available online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=715181;
Unexplainable on Grounds Other Than Race, 45 A.U. L. Rev. 729-49 (1996); Race Trilogy, 67 Temple
L. Rev. 1 (1994); Civil Rights, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL
SCIENCES (Elsevier 2001); Searching for the Rule of Law, 36 Suffolk L. Rev. 307 (2003), available online
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=724341; WITH LIBERTY AND JUSTICE FOR SOME, A CRITIQUE OF THE
CONSERVATIVE SUPREME COURT (New Press 1993). See also Freedom of Speech, a chapter of THE
P OLITICS OF LAW, A P ROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE (David Kairys, ed., Pantheon 1982), available online at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=727903; Introduction, THE POLITICS OF LAW, A P ROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE
(David Kairys, ed., 3d ed., Basic Books 1998), available online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=841469. For a
collection of the Supreme Court’s race decisions with excerpts, see Abraham Davis & Barbara Graham,
THE SUPREME COURT , RACE, AND CIVIL RIGHTS (Sage 1995).
2 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Critical race theory has yielded a range of significant analyses of Brown
and race issues generally. See Kimberle Crenshaw, Neil Gotanda, Garry Peller, & Kendall Thomas,
CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT (New Press 1996);
Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE (N.Y.U. 2001); Angela
Harris, Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION (N.Y.U. 2000);
Derrick Bell, SILENT COVENANTS, BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR
RACIAL REFORM (Oxford 2004); Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution Is Color-Blind,” 44 Stan.
L. Rev. 1 (1993); Cheryl Harris, Whiteness as Property, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 1707 (1993). See also
Michael Omi & Howard Winant, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES (Routlege, 2nd ed. 1997).
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of law, @ Areason over bigotry,@ AAmerican justice@ B with Brown sometimes sounding like
a transformative event or cultural icon in addition to a major constitutional decision.
Others share the goal B equality B but criticize the strategy, like leading scholar Derrick
Bell, who has suggested that focusing on the equal in separate but equal might have been
preferable.3 Still others, but very few, disapprove, with reactions like Ajudicial activism,@
Adestruction of states= rights,@ and Asocial science, not law.@
The second case: Memphis v. Greene . . . .4
The usual reaction is something like AMemphis what?,@ even among legal
audiences. This 1981 decision is regularly ignored, along with the Court=s other
decisions in which African Americans and other minorities challenged racial
discrimination in the period from the mid-1970s through the 1980s.
At the request of residents of the Hein Park section of Memphis, Tennessee, the
city erected a traffic barrier across West Drive, the main street through Hein Park, at the
cross street that divides Hein Park from the neighboring black community. Hein Park is a
development built before World War II that was conceived and advertised as all-white.
There were restrictive covenants in all the deeds that forbade sale by the original or
succeeding owners to nonwhites.
The black community had used West Drive to get to the city zoo, a park and other
attractions. In the 1950s and 1960s, Memphis actively resisted integration, allowing

3 Bell, supra note 2.
4 451 U.S. 100 (1981).
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blacks access to the same public recreation facilities only after a unanimous Supreme
Court decision ordered them to do so.5 N.T. Greene, the lead plaintiff, testified that when
he walked into Hein Park as a young man, he was picked up by police, thrown out, and
told not to come back.
The process of city approval of the street closure was characterized by procedural
and substantive irregularities. City regulations on street closure B previously limited to
alleys and dead-ends, never before done to a through street B required the consent of all
the adjoining property owners. But one of the white owners on West Drive refused to
consent, reportedly because he thought the closure was racist. Some of the hearings and
proceedings were conducted without notice to the black community.
The Memphis City Council concluded the process by selling a 25-foot wide strip
of road across West Drive at the closure point to the two white landowners on either side,
and passed a resolution that said the 25-foot wide strip was Aclosed to the public.@ No
reason was given, but the apparent purpose was to make the closure and use of West
Drive private rather than governmental matters, and thereby to insulate the government=s
actions from legal challenge on constitutional grounds.
Greene and the other black plaintiffs challenged the city=s actions as
discriminatory and as a step back toward segregation in violation of the thirteenth and
5 Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526, 534, 538-39 (1963) (the Court found Aan
unmistakable and pervasive pattern of local segregation, which, in fact, the city makes no attempt to
deny@ and concluded that Athe city has completely failed to demonstrate any compelling or convincing
reason requiring further delay in implementing the constitutional proscription of segregation of publicly
owned or operated recreational facilities@). Segregated public recreation facilities were invalidated the
year after Brown. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955).
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fourteenth amendments.6 The Supreme Court rejected the claims because the plaintiffs
had not proved Apurposeful discrimination.@ The city asserted that the street was closed
to remove Acar traffic@ from a residential area, not for any racial purpose. The only direct
or explicit evidence otherwise was a statement at one of the hearings that the Hein Park
residents wished to get rid of Aundesirable traffic.@ This could mean either the cars or the
people in them were thought undesirable. In any event, it was not, as purposeful
discrimination has been interpreted to require, attributable to the Hein Park Civic
Association, which requested the street closure, or, more importantly, to the City Council
members who voted for it, although Aclosed to the public@ in the city council resolution
includes people and cars.
Isn=t governmental discrimination against minorities unconstitutional?
Starting in the mid-1970s B only 20 years after Brown B the Supreme Court
developed an extremely restrictive rule for cases in which minorities claim race
discrimination, a rule that has made it near impossible for those claims to succeed. This
rule has been applied across the board and to the most basic discrimination issues. From
the mid-1970s through the 1980s, discrimination claims brought by African Americans
and other minorities were rejected for lack of proof of purposeful discrimination on the
issues that significantly defined the not-very-distant segregated past: job discrimination,
voting discrimination, housing discrimination, segregated schools, the death penalty.7

6 On the thirteenth and fourteenth amendment claims in Memphis, see More or Less Equal, supra
note 1, at 678-79, 678 n. 14, 686 n. 78.
7 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980);
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Though the purposeful discrimination rule is often referred to as the Aintentional@
discrimination rule, it does not use a typical legal or civilian understanding of intent, by
which one is deemed to intend the known or reasonable consequences of one=s acts.
Further, although the Court has consistently said that circumstantial proof can be
sufficient B relief is, in theory, not limited to explicitly racial measures B since the mid1970s the Court has rejected inferences of purposeful discrimination against minorities in
even the most compelling circumstances. For example, Mobile, Alabama=s unusual atlarge electoral scheme assured that its city commission was all-white in spite of a
substantial black population; but the Supreme Court found repeated use of it, which
might meet an intentional standard, insufficient to make out a case in the absence of
additional proof of a racial purpose.8
It is hard to imagine a circumstantial case stronger than Memphis, or to explain the
Court=s conclusion that there was Ano evidence@ of purposeful discrimination. The rule
and its interpretation by the Court focus on purpose or motive in the narrowest sense:
whatever the consequences, and however much the circumstances resemble traditional
racial discrimination or segregation, there is no constitutional violation unless there is
also direct proof that the action or measure was taken for the specific purpose of
discriminating against or with animus toward the minority. 9

Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Devel. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717
(1974); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
8 Mobile v. Bolden, supra. The other ingredient that led to the lack of black representation was
the consistent practice by whites of voting only for white candidates.
9 The ultimate of this reasoning is the case approving the imprisonment of all people of Japanese
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Except in the rare circumstance that there is direct proof of racial purpose, the
government does not have to explain its actions, even if they resemble segregation or
traditional discrimination. In Memphis, the Court simply accepted the city=s assertion
that the street closure was about car traffic. Memphis did not have to explain why it did
not lower the speed limit or install street bumps to lessen and control traffic, or why it
sold that 25-foot wide strip of street to two white landowners.10
There is also a counterintuitive but quite real way in which the purposeful
discrimination rule facilitates purposeful discrimination. A purposeful discriminator can
strategically avoid mentioning race or providing any proof of racial purpose and will
never have to explain his or her actions specifically or in any detail. I have speculated
elsewhere that this may have happened in the Memphis case.11
The plight of post-Brown minority claims of discrimination before the Supreme
Court has been regularly ignored.12 For example, the affirmative action debate proceeds
with the assumption by both sides that discrimination against minorities was eliminated
long ago and would be invalidated when and if it might occur again. That assumption is

ancestry on the west coast during World War II, Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), where
even though the regulation was explicitly racial, the Court found no equal protection violation because the
purpose was national security.
10 The Court=s approach, which I have called the Apurpose doctrine,@ now dominates not only
discrimination issues but the range of civil rights and civil liberties. Rights that used to be vindicated if
they were violated now can only be established if there is also proof that the government=s violation was
done for a bad purpose. See note 1, supra.
11 See More or Less Equal, Unexplainable on Grounds other than Race, Race Trilogy, all supra
note 1.
12 But it did not go unnoticed. See particularly Alan Freeman, Legitimating Racial
Discrimination with Anti-Discrimination Law, 62 Minn. L. Rev. 1049 (1978); Alan Freeman,
Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review, in THE P OLITICS OF LAW (1982), supra note 1.

6

false.
This brings me to the first of three points I want to make. The period of
invalidation of discrimination against African Americans and other minorities following
Brown was short-lived and essentially limited to explicitly racial measures or actions,
leaving on the ground and untouched the social reality that was the legacy of segregation,
Jim Crow and slavery. The remnants and effects of past discrimination and segregation
and ongoing discrimination B which were not limited to the explicit, virulent epithets of
the Ku Klux Klan B were not eliminated.
In this period, nonexplicit forms of discrimination grew rather than diminished in
number and significance, and were more easily nonexplicit, as related social changes left
African Americans increasingly separated geographically from whites. Whites in the
new white suburbs got discriminatory, preferential treatment on home financing, schools,
healthcare, work, insurance, veteran’s benefits, and the costs of just about everything –
much of it implemented or facilitated by governmental policies and practices.
Discrimination and minority disadvantage were perpetuated and extended in new, usually
nonexplicit ways.13

13 See, e.g., Ira Katznelson, WHEN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION WAS WHITE, AN UNTOLD HISTORY OF
RACIAL INEQUALITY IN TWENTIETH -CENTURY AM ERICA (Norton 2005); Douglas Massey and Nancy
Denton, AMERICAN APARTHEID, SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (Harvard 1998);
Michael Brown, et al., WHITE-WASHING RACE, THE MYTH OF A COLOR-BLIND SOCIETY (California
2003); Bell, supra note 2. Katznelson frames the advantages to whites as a form of affirmative action.
There is another, regularly overlooked form of affirmative action extended earlier to whites who had
suffered discrimination: preferences in hiring and employment by our major cities. Germans, Irish and
Italians, for instance, got good city jobs and a step into the middle class by discriminatory hiring practices
that favored them. For example, the police department in Philadelphia was almost all of German
ancestry, then almost all Irish, then largely Italian. The elevation of Frank Rizzo to police commissioner
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The Supreme Court pulled back, which significantly contributed to the insulation
of discrimination against minorities from political as well as legal challenges and to the
social and cultural shift in which the stigma of racial impropriety moved from
discrimination against minorities to challenging nonexplicit discrimination against
minorities, or, as we so often hear it characterized these days, to ‘playing the race card.’
We are still living with this failure and lost opportunity. Many of our current woes,
including the range of racial and urban problems, are traceable in part to the failure in this
period to deal with contemporary or future discrimination and the effects of past
discrimination and segregation.
So what is going on? How did the ultimate justice become legitimation of an
unjust status quo and further injustice? These are my two remaining points: How and
why were Brown and Memphis decided? Which might be fairly characterized as typical
of the Supreme Court=s history on race issues, which as an aberration?
How are constitutional decisions made?
There are a great variety of models, methods, theories and approaches directed at
the how and why of judicial decision making: originalism, textualism, what might be
called contextualism, legal realism, judicial restraint, law and economics, and so on.
Some prioritize particular rights or issues, others stress morality, still others prioritize

in 1967 was controversial within the department because he was the first commissioner of Italian
ancestry, and many doubted that an Italian could do the job. See S.A. Paolantonio, FRANK RIZZO: THE
LAST BIG MAN IN BIG CITY AMERICA (Camino 1993).
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methods or the judicial process. Some attempt to explain judicial decision making, while
others establish norms or priorities for the exercise of judicial review or other judicial
functions.14
The categorization I find most helpful for present purposes is a continuum with
objective/determinate on one end and s ubjective/indeterminate on the other.
Objective/determinate emphasizes legal doctrine and legal reasoning and recognizes little
or no discretion. Law is seen as separate from politics, morality, values.
Subjective/indeterminate emphasizes context and values, the lack of required rules or
results, judicial discretion. Law is seen as a social process, and understanding law or
judicial decision making involves the usual disciplines that focus on social processes:
sociology, history, political science, anthropology, economics, social policy.
The judicial stance and the content of opinions issued by courts are emphatically
objective/determinate. Even when judges find the Alaw@ murky, they resort to analysis of
Apolicy@ that they present as objective and unrelated to their or anyone=s values. The
theme of most every judicial opinion is >the law made me do it.= 15
This leads to a basic contradiction that was on display recently in the controversy
over the appointment of Samuel Alito to the Supreme Court. Al ito=s supporters could not
14 Some approaches or models, including some listed above, have explanatory and normative
versions. For example, law and economics is sometimes used to explain why decisions are made and
other times to establish norms for decision making.
15 Those old enough may remember the comedian Flip Wilson, who had a routine that led me to
this formulation. He excused all sorts of bad conduct with Athe devil made me do it.@ No further
explanation or justification was offered or necessary. He won the 1970 Grammy for best comedy album,
“The Devil Made Me Buy This Dress.” See
http://theenvelope.latimes.com/extras/lostmind/year/1970/1970grammy.htm.
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seem to make up their minds if they like him because he doesn=t apply values or because
they like the values he applies. This contradiction is not limited to conservatives; liberal
discourse, on Alito as well as judges they like and on law generally, has the same basic
contradiction. This tends to mask and rationalize the unusually large role and power of
courts in our system, which includes, in addition to resolution of disputes and broad
powers of interpretation, resolution of all questions of freedom, democracy and equality,
our most cherished principles.16
I place legal decision making at the subjective/indeterminate end, for three easy
reasons. First, language and interpretation do not yield required meanings of texts.
Second, the law embraces principles, values, and policies that conflict with no required
prioritization or method for determining which takes precedence in particular
circumstances. Third, the law embraces a range of methods and strategies of
argumentation without requiring any particular one or set of them in particular
circumstances. The result is discretion, choice, which is necessarily based on some
values or priorities not required by legal analysis or legal reasoning. 17
Often the law on a particular issue or in a particular circumstance can be clear or
16 See note 1, supra; David Kairys, AAlito=s Discrimination Problem,@ Jurist, January 28, 2006,
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2006/01/alitos-discrimination-problem.php.
17 Other aspects of judicial decision making yield additional discretion. “The facts” depend on a
variety of judgments about admissibility, relevance, credibility and weight of evidence; “procedural”
issues without required outcomes can be determinative; judges are aware of the identities of the parties
and the significance of an issue or case to various nonparties; and judges have the discretion to decide
what they decide. There are constraints, including disapproval of peers, public criticism, reversal,
impeachment; and judges can be unaware of their discretion and perceive themselves as doing what is
required. A judge applying straightforward, longstanding rules to uncontested facts can easily perceive a
required result; but the discretion is there, nevertheless, and would be more apparent if the matter were or
became controversial among lawyers, judges or the public, or for the judge personally. See note 1, supra.
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longstanding, which makes it appear to be required. But this is because the issue is not
currently controversial.18 Maybe there is a consensus, or maybe folks have gotten tired of
fighting about it. If it becomes controversial later, the lack of a required rule or result
will be apparent. Law might be usefully characterized as a form of record-keeping of
interrupted fighting. Despite the elaborate explanations and the frequent references to
highest principles, it=s never really over B victories often have to be defended and defeats
can always be challenged, in a range of ways and places including but not limited to
courts. The recorded version usually tends to stand until it is challenged or becomes
controversial.
So if we want to understand Brown and Memphis, and judicial decisions generally,
we should look at legal doctrine and legal texts, but also at the social context, social
trends, attitudes and movements, the particular justices, and so on, and determine and
assess the various options available to the justices.19

18 There is also a common tendency to view decisions with which one agrees as Aright@ and
required and to view justices with whom one agrees as smarter, fairer or more in touch with the
Constitution, usually with the opposite tendency when one disagrees.
19 See note 1, supra, particularly Freedom of Speech (1982), at 159-63. For recent works with
similar approaches and sometimes similar, sometimes different conclusions, see Michael Kent Curtis,
FREE SPEECH ,"THE P EOPLE'S DARLING P RIVILEGE": STRUGGLES FOR FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN
AMERICAN HISTORY (Duke 2000); James Pope, The Thirteenth Amendment versus the Commerce Clause:
Labor and the Shaping of American Constitutional Law, 1921-1957, 102 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (2002); Laura
Kalman, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM (Yale 1996); Kenneth Mack, Rethinking Civil
Rights Lawyering and Politics in the Era Before Brown , 115 Yale L. J. 256 (2005); Michael Klarman,
FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS (Oxford 2004). For example, Professor Klarman=s approach and
conclusions are often similar. Compare particularly Michael Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and
Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 Va. L. Rev. 1, 34-46 (1996) (on the history of free speech) and my
Freedom of Speech (1982), supra note 1. But in From Jim Crow to Civil Rights he draws a sharp
distinction between more-or-less required law and subjective or political considerations (while also
acknowledging that law often depends on subjective or political considerations, which would seem to
undercut the sharp distinction); and he has a very limited view of the effects of Brown, suggesting that it
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In Brown, precedent was opposed B Plessy v. Ferguson, which approved of
segregation on trains, was the leading case B and historical research showed it was
doubtful that supporters of the fourteenth amendment believed that the equal protection
clause forbade segregated schools.20 But there had been some sporadic movement in the
Supreme Court toward more meaningful equality and toward a contemporary
interpretation of the fourteenth amendment: exclusion of African Americans from juries
was invalidated in 1880; equal protection was applied to effects and applications of nonexplicit legislation in 1886; a law explicitly establishing segregated neighborhoods was
invalidated in 1917; an all-white primary was invalidated in 1927; restrictive covenants,
which the Hein Park development used, were ruled unenforceable in 1948; and equal in
separate but equal was given more teeth in a law school admission case in 1950. There
was backsliding after most of these, and none of them went as far as Brown, but Brown
was not a total eruption, as it is often depicted. 21

had little or nothing to do with the Montgomery bus boycott or with the passage of the civil rights acts in
the 1960s, except by provoking southern extremism which, televised, engendered widespread support for
the acts. On the Montgomery bus boycott, see, e.g., Martin Luther King, Jr.=s stirring speech in 1955 at
the mass gathering that decided to proceed with the boycott: AIf we are wrong, then the Supreme Court is
wrong. If we are wrong, then the Constitution of the United States is wrong. If we are wrong, then Great
God Almighty is wrong.@ AAwakenings (1954-56),@ Episode 1, Eyes on the Prize, America=s Civil Rights
Years (PBS Video 1986). On the 1960s, viciousness toward African Americans in the south and
elsewhere did not need any provocation or start with or increase only after Brown; any significant move
toward equality, not just Brown , received a strong, often violent reaction; and the new moral repugnance
toward racism and segregation in this period, to which Brown surely contributed significantly , drew
media attention to race issues and racial viciousness that were previously ignored.
20 See Mark Tushnet, Brown v. Board of Education, a chapter of Annette Gordon-Reed, RACE ON
TRIAL (Oxford 2002); Klarman, From Jim Crow to Civil Rights, supra note 18.
21 See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896); Strauder v. W. Va., 100 U.S. 303 (1879); Yick
Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917); Nixon v. Herndon, 273
U.S. 536 (1927); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950). The
year after Brown, the Court ruled that American Indians do not have any fifth amendment rights to
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World War II brought social and economic change, and black men returned from
fighting in a segregated army but with heightened expectations. The accomplishments of
black people in many fields exceeded and belied the racial stereotypes. There was
activism against segregation long before the 1960s or 1954, including sit-ins in the 1940s
and boycotts decades before that. We were a leading nation whose moral leadership and
position was widely criticized and challenged because of segregation.
The individual justices are, of course, important to a development like Brown B
their backgrounds, education, experiences, values. They usually come from the elite of
American society, though they weren=t always born there. Many were picked by
presidents because of concrete expectations about how they would rule on some
particular issues or how they would approach their roles. Some wrote explanations of
why they did what they did, and sometimes there are notes or memories of what they said
about decisions.
One can assess these factors and others and arrive at available options and reasons
why one or another might be preferred. The assessment and results are probabilistic. Of
course, knowing what they did and how they explained it in their opinions helps;
predicting is far more difficult. And much is, as in history and life, unexpected and
compensation if Congress takes their land, or apparently any individual rights beyond discretionary
benefits that may be provided to tribes:
No case in this Court has ever held that taking of Indian title or use by Congress required
compensation. The American people have compassion for the descendants of those Indians who
were deprived of their homes and hunting grounds by the drive of civilization. They seek to have
the Indians share the benefits of our society as citizens of this Nation. Generous provision has
been willingly made to allow tribes to recover for wrongs, as a matter of grace, not because of
legal liability.
Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 281-82 (1955).
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arbitrary. For example, Chief Justice Vinson died just before the Brown decision,
probably making unanimity possible; Justice Robert Jackson, who carried considerable
weight in legal circles and with the public, died only months after.
The various factors and Brown itself are usually both cause and effect, and it is not
easy to separate the two. For instance, rising black expectations contributed to Brown,
and Brown contributed to rising black expectations. One of the most important social and
cultural changes that Brown significantly contributed to was a new consensus that r acism
and prejudice are morally, socially and politically wrong. From before World War II to
sometime after Brown, racial epithets and explicitly racial politics went from common
and uneventful to wrong. Even factions of the Ku Klux Klan came to realize that explicit
racism limited recruitment because it became so universally condemned. One can almost
feel sorry for David Duke B how do you gain support for the Klan and what it stands for
if you can no longer use catchy racist rhetoric? This also played a significant role in the
later extension of equality to other groups, women, youth, people with disabilities, sexual
preference minorities.
If we look at Memphis the same way, but more briefly here, politics, public
attitudes and electoral results had shifted in a conservative direction, and race was one of
the issues central to the shift. AColorblindness,@ which speaks to an unrealized ideal
rather than racial and social reality, became the formulation for the winning electoral
strategy and became the racial policy of government and the courts. Judicial
appointments were actively screened on race issues, often phrased in terms of opposition
14

to affirmative action or Aquotas.@ Conservative presidents consistently selected justices
who seemed clearly in that mold – more consistently and openly than on any other issue,
including abortion. This continued even in the brief interlude after the Watergate scandal
when President Gerald Ford appointed a “moderate,” Justice John Paul Stevens, who
wrote the majority opinion in Memphis.22 A lawyer who opposed the earliest steps
toward equality and integration B including opposition to Brown itself B became a
Supreme Court justice, and later Chief Justice.23
Which is the aberration?
It is not hard to sketch out a brief racial history of the Supreme Court because it is
fairly consistent and has few big changes. Chief Justice Marshall=s court upheld and
legitimated slavery in a range of decisions, including holding in 1825 that although
slavery violates the Alaw of nature,@ it is legal and constitutional in the United States and
does not violate international law. In 1842, the Court upheld the Fugitive Slave Act and
22 See http://www.supremecourthistory.org/myweb/justice/stevens.htm. Justice Stevens, now as
close to liberal as they come on the Supreme Court, changed; it is possible that he would not vote the
same way today.
23 Chief Justice William Rehnquist wrote in a memo as a law clerk for Justice Robert Jackson,
regarding cases that would become Brown , that the Aseparate but equal@ principle was Aright and should
be reaffirmed.@ He urged in another memo that Jackson approve of all-white primaries: AIt=s about time
the Court faced the fact that the white people of the South don=t like the colored people.@ As a young
attorney in Phoenix, Rehnquist opposed a public accommodations law proposed in response to the city’s
embarrassment when at a national meeting of lawyers a top hotel refused to admit Jewish guests; he was
active in “poll watching teams” accused of obstructing voters in African American and Hispanic
neighborhoods; and he opposed a school integration proposal with the argument that “[w]e are no more
dedicated to an ‘integrated’ society than we are to a ‘segregated’ society.” In the Reagan justice
department, he vehemently opposed the proposed equal rights constitutional amendment guaranteeing
equality for women. See David Savage, TURNING RIGHT , THE MAKING OF THE REHNQUIST SUPREME
COURT ch. 2 (John Wiley & Sons 1992). In the 1950s and 1960s, opposition to integration and to the
civil rights acts defined conservatism. For example, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibited
discrimination in public accommodations, was opposed in the House by a moderate conservative from
Texas, George H.W. Bush.
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invalidated Apersonal liberty@ laws adopted in several states that in some circumstances
granted freedom to slaves in their jurisdictions. The infamous Dred Scott decision in
1857 reaffirmed slavery, essentially denied the humanity of people of African descent,
destroyed the Missouri Compromise, and significantly contributed to the Civil War.
African Americans, the Court said, have Ano rights the white man is bound to respect.@ 24
In the late 1800s, the Supreme Court undercut if not destroyed the post-Civil War
amendments and betrayed the results and sacrifice of the War. The Court essentially
nullified the Aprivileges and immunities@ clause of the fourteenth amendment, struck
down a public accommodations law passed by Congress, and upheld segregation on
trains with broad reasoning that would legitimate segregation until Brown. 25
The first half of the 20th century saw mostly a continuation of the Supreme Court=s
rejection of minority claims and rights, with some exceptions and swings back and forth,
and the sporadic beginnings of significant change noted earlier, particularly from the
mid-1930s to the mid-1940s. The Court invalidated legally segregated neighborhoods in
1917, and swung back and forth on all-white primaries. In the mid-1930s to the mid1940s, there were inconsistencies,26 but the Court significantly established meaningful
rights for criminal defendants mostly in cases involving racial issues, required some

24 See The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66 (1825); Prigg v. Comm. of Penna., 41 U.S. (16 Pet.)
539 (1842); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1857).
25 See Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3
(1883); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
th
26 Probably the worst rejection of minority rights in the 20 century came in 1944 when the Court
upheld the World War II imprisonment of all people of Japanese ancestry on the west coast. Korematsu
v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). See With Liberty and Justice for Some, supra note 1, ch. 1.
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equality amongst segregated schools, and made some strides on public
accommodations.27
After Brown, there was some integration of public schools (including the
Baltimore high school I attended), and for a couple decades the Court mandated
desegregation in cases challenging recalcitrant school systems. In other areas, the Court
invalidated a range of explicitly racial governmental regulations and actions and some
nonexplicit governmental and private discrimination; upheld the civil rights acts of the
1960s; strengthened and expanded free speech and voting rights; and protected civil
rights and other protest groups from governmental and private repression. This period
deserves the oft-repeated designation as a civil rights revolution. 28
But the triumph of the narrow purposeful discrimination rule from the mid-1970s
through the 1980s, epitomized by Memphis, made it near impossible for a minority to
establish a case of race discrimination, no matter ho w strong the resemblance to
traditional discrimination or to pre-Brown segregation. In this same period, school
integration stalled. The “all deliberate speed” scheme for school integration adopted by
27 See Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232 (1921); Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45
(1935); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944);
Buchanan v. Warley, supra; Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587
(1935); Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923); Brown v. Miss., 297 U.S. 278 (1936); Miss. ex rel.
Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938); Mitchell v. United States, 313 U.S. 80 (1941).
28 See Brown II, 349 U.S. 294 (1955); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); Green v. School
Board of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715
(1961);Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960); Harper v. Va. Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663
(1966); U.S. v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966); Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971); Whitus v. Ga.,
385 U.S. 545 (1967); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. U.S., 379 U.S. 241 (1964); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S.
449 (1958); Garner v. La.., 368 U.S. 157 (1961); Edwards v. S.C., 372 U.S. 229 (1963); Cox v. La., 379
U.S. 536, 379 U.S. 559 (1965); Brown v. La., 383 U.S. 131 (1966). The Court also famously expanded
the rights of criminal defendants.
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the Court in 1955 made it difficult for even cooperative lower federal judges to produce
results without constant monitoring and pressure. In the 1970s, the Supreme Court
backed off the mandate, and later the Court rewarded evasion and stalling with decisions
that allowed segregated schools because current purposeful discrimination wasn’t proved
or because too much time had passed. 29
Much had changed, including the eradication of legally enshrined segregation and
the emergence of a sizable black middle class. But most African Americans and other
minorities still faced the legacy of segregation, Jim Crow and slavery: involuntarily
segregated lives, including inadequate and largely still segregated schools,
discrimination, and often extreme deprivation.
After the mid-1970s, the Supreme Court refused to invalidate ongoing
discrimination against minorities in its various forms or to deal with the effects of past
discrimination and segregation. Then the Court prohibited legislative and executive
attempts to do so B invalidating good faith affirmative action and good faith remedial
efforts as if they were constitutionally and socially the same as the white-imposed
segregation and discrimination of the not-so-distant past. From the mid-1970s to the
present almost all of the winning plaintiffs in racial equal protection cases decided by the
Supreme Court have been white, and the small number of non-whites who won almost all
challenged remaining explicit discrimination or the unrepresentativeness of juries, which
involves the integrity and legitimacy of the legal system as well as the usual
29 See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974); Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995).
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discrimination issues.30
In the Court=s majority opinions in “reverse discrimination” cases over the last few
decades, there has been a reversal of social roles: whites are the victims, and blacks are
the discriminators. This reversal has been justified, with more than a little irony, by the
new abhorrence of racism and the success of the civil rights movement. The opinions are
more morally based and rhetorical than opinions generally these days, including
appropriation of the history and moral force of the various struggles against white
supremacy in the U.S. and many other parts of the world.
The conservative justices (a label they all accept) are on a moral crusade against
racism: their duty and mandate, they tell us, is to Asmoke out@ racism. They characterize
the small number of majority-black districts drawn under the Voting Rights Act B to
counter the all majority-white districts purposely drawn previously ( but insulated from
challenge by their narrow purposeful discrimination rule for minority claims) B as a form
of Aapartheid.@ This is a strange time and place in American history to start a moral
crusade against racism. 31
Taken together, t he Court’s race decisions over the past few decades make it quite
easy for white pl aintiffs to make out a claim of reverse discrimination – to invalidate

30 See City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Adarand v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995);
Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995). The most significant
exception is Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), on affirmative action in education, where the
difference was Justice O=Connor=s not going along with the trend, probably based on amici briefs from the
military and major corporations on the importance of diversity.
31 Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 (Asmoke out@ racism); Shaw, 509 U.S. at 647 (Auncomfortable
resemblance to political apartheid @).
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good faith legislative and executive efforts to make equality meaningful – but near
impossible for minority plaintiffs to make out a claim of discrimination, even if the
circumstances closely resemble traditional discrimination against minorities or pre-Brown
segregation. The Court has essentially established two distinct sets of rules, assumptions
and approaches that depend on whether whites or minorities are claiming discrimination,
which I have characterized as a “dual system” rather than the uniform system the Court
purports to apply to all discrimination claims. 32
Looking at the whole history of the Supreme Court’s decisions in race cases, there
are some exceptions before Brown: the Amistad case33 and the sporadic decisions leading
up to Brown mentioned earlier are examples. But these decisions often involve d other
issues, tended to avoid direct challenges to slavery, Jim Crow or segregation, and were in
no sense comparable to Brown. The aberration is Brown v. Board of Education.
Civil rights, equality and the rule of law
Justice Robert Jackson, former attorney general and solicitor general and lead
prosecutor at the Nuremberg trials, said in 1941: ANever in its entire history can the
Supreme Court be said to have for a single hour been representative of anything except
the relatively conservative forces of its day.@ 34 That is no longer true, due in part to

32 See More or Less Equal, Unexplainable on Grounds other than Race, Race Trilogy, With
Liberty and Justice for Some, all supra note 1. These materials explain how a dual system developed
from what purports to be uniform application of the purposeful discrimination rule, including very
different approaches to “pre-scrutiny scrutiny,” the analysis by which the Court decides whether strict
scrutiny is applicable.
33 United States v. The Amistad, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 518 (1841).
34 Robert Jackson, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 187 (Knopf 1941). One could
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Jackson=s elevation to the Court, but our deep-seated and seemingly timeless conception
of courts and law as protectors of civil rights emerged later, within the last half century or
so. But e ven in the 1960s, most of the dismantling of segregation and prohibition of
discrimination came from Congress, not the Supreme Court B Congress prohibited, most
significantly, discrimination in voting, employment, housing, and public
accommodations.35
We have idealized courts and, particularly, the Supreme Court as guardians of
minorities, dissenters, and anyone oppressed or treated unjustly. Human rights are
regularly treated as tied to the hip of courts and the rule of law, as if courts and the rule of
law are a fountain from which human rights necessarily and automatically flow. A
reliable, fair legal system can certainly facilitate human rights, but if the laws (or judges)
are oppressive, following the rules laid down with the fairest legal process still yields
oppression. Consider South Africa under apartheid or the United States before 1954.36
An honest, unsentimental look at the legal history of the United States37 reveals

conclude that it has continued to be true depending on how “relatively conservative forces” is defined.
35 Civil Rights Acts of 1960, 1964, 1965, and 1968, 42 U.S.C. '' 1971, 1973, 1975, 1985, 2000,
3601 (1991). See generally Introduction, THE P OLITICS OF LAW (3d ed.), supra note 1.
36 See Robert Cover, JUSTICE ACCUSED , ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL P ROCESS (Yale 1975) .
37 I formulated this understanding of the history of civil rights and civil liberties in the U.S. in
writings mostly focused on the history of freedom of speech. See Freedom of Speech (1982), supra note
1, and other works cited in note 1, supra, emphasizing the role of the labor movement in the establishment
of free speech as we know it, which did not occur until the 1930s. Legal history, particularly as practiced
in legal academia, tends to be limited to the realm of legal doctrines and ideas, as if they were originated,
developed and adopted based on legal analyses, and can be understood separate from and independent of
what goes on in the rest of society and what we commonly call history. In the area of free speech, this has
included historical accounts that are otherwise contextual and insightful. See David Rabban, FREE
SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS (Cambridge 1997); Samuel Walker, IN DEFENSE OF AMERICAN
LIBERTIES : A HISTORY OF THE ACLU (Southern Illinois University Press, 2d ed. 1999). See also Paul
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only two periods characterized by sustained, systematic protection of civil rights and civil
liberties by the Supreme Court: from about 1937 to 1944 and from about 1961 (or 1954
including Brown) to 1973.38 And these two periods occurred because justices held and
forcefully applied particular values B progressive values and a progressive conception of
civil rights and civil liberties B not because of any absence of values or any legal analysis.
It is hard not to notice, but it regularly goes unnoticed, that these are also periods
in which powerful movements built on those same values – the labor movement in the
1930s and the civil rights movement in the 1960s – demanded such rights and were
successfully moving public and private institutions, government officials and public
opinion in their direction. I am not suggesting a linear or direct relationship between
Starr, THE CREATION OF THE MEDIA, P OLITICAL ORIGINS OF MODERN COMMUNICATIONS, ch. 8 (Basic
Books 2004), an otherwise path breaking account of the history of the media; Eric Foner, Review of
Geoffrey Stone, IN P ERILOUS TIMES, The Nation, Dec. 6, 2004. Rabban’s history of free speech is known
for his recognition that speech as we know it was not legally protected until the 20th century. However,
his account ends when the ‘right’ ideas and doctrines are articulated in the 1920s , in the form of
dissenting and concurring Supreme Court opinions, reversed lower-court opinions , and theoretical
writings by Holmes, Brandeis, Hand and others, instead of when a majority of the Supreme Court actually
adopted them. The inspiring dissents were not inevitably to be adopted by the Supreme Court – because
they were ‘right’ or based on any legal analysis. They were not adopted until the 1930s, and still have not
been adopted in any other western country despite articulate advocates. A major change occurred in the
1930s, in the Supreme Court as well as society generally. In the latest version of his history, Rabban
seems to address this not by focusing on the 1930s but by placing the change in 1927. He cites Fiske v.
Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927), as the first of “the initial Supreme Court decisions protecting speech” and
“the first case recogniz[ing] the free speech claim of a radical defendant.” Rabban, at 373-74. This is
quite a stretch. Fiske, decided along with and specifically confirming a typically repressive decision of
the period, Whitney v. California , 274 U.S. 357 (1927) (not overruled until 1937 and the occasion for one
of the famous Holmes-Brandeis opinions differing with the majority), held that there was no proof
introduced at trial that the group the defendant belonged to advocated unlawful means to political ends,
not that one had a speech right to do so or an associational right to belong to a group that so advocated.
38 On racial issues the beginning of the second period was 1954, but on many other human rights
issues, it was, as I have usually suggested, 1961, since the late 1950s saw a retrenchment of speech and
political rights. See, e.g., Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957). The two periods are connected;
for example, many of the values and leaders from the labor and New Deal era, including justices of the
Supreme Court, played a significant role in the civil rights era.
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Supreme Court decisions and movements or public opinion; other powerful movements
have not had such success because Supreme Court decisions rest on a range of factors, as
discussed earlier. But that is how unusual sustained, vigorous protection of civil rights
and liberties is and how much it took to attain.
Movements affect court decisions, and vice versa, because both are about power,
legitimacy and contemporary values.39 The mechanics can be complex. In one sense, a
successful movement, particularly one that is prominent for a long time, simply changes
public attitudes, perceptions and values (and sometimes electoral results), including the
attitudes, perceptions and values of justices and the presidents who appoint them.
Movements that gain some success can confer legitimacy and mainstream status on
attitudes, perceptions and values that were previously ignored, unpopular, or despised. 40
Movements that accomplish significant social change affect individuals, including
judges, through mass media, public and private associations, professional groups, peer
pressures, and so on. Judges’ views change not because of more legal research or
because they have gotten more in touch with the framers of the Constitution; as people
living and working in society, they are affected by historical and social changes and the
events and people surrounding them. As judges, they tend to express a new social
consciousness in legal terms.

39 See Freedom of Speech (1982), supra note 1, at 159-63, 159-60 n. *, which includes a

discussion of the ways movements affect judges and of methodological issues. See also David Kairys,
Book review of Michael Tigar, LAW AND THE RISE OF CAPITALISM , 126 U. Pa. L. Rev. 930, 943 (1978).
40 Movements in the United States are often about the law and specifically the meaning or
interpretation of the Constitution, and often focus directly on court decisions and judges.
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Successful movements also shift power and become a force to be reckoned with
for those who disagree as well as validation and support for those who agree. Some who
disagree will be unchanged or more vehement in their opposition; others, though also
unchanged, will compromise. Some in Congress and on the Supreme Court, as well as
many leaders of business and industry, took the latter course in response to the labor
movement in the 1930s, choosing to incorporate it into the system rather than continuing
the increasingly risky struggle to suppress or destroy it.41 For justices of the Supreme
Court, the risks include alienating the public undercutting the legitimacy of the courts.
Conservative and progressive movements work in much the same way – the
Supreme Court, like the contemporary conservative movement, is now some 30 years
into a judicial regime characterized by conservative values, perceptions and approaches
that were generally viewed as extreme and marginal in the early 1970s. But there is a
difference. The Supreme Court appears to have a default position, and it’s hard to change
the settings. The default position is not easy to define, but for most times and contexts
Justice Jackson’s formulation – the values and approaches of the “relatively conservative
forces” – is a pretty good description. A successful conservative movement can move it

41 Many progressive victories have come with the eventual support of corporate leaders usually
identified with the opposition. For example, Andrew Carnegie paid the legal expenses of some labor
leaders, see James Weinstein, THE CORPORATE IDEAL IN THE LIBERAL STATE 49 (Beacon 1968), and was
instrumental in the founding of the American Law Institute because “[t]here is today general
dissatisfaction with the administration of justice. . . . that it . . . often results not in justice but injustice . . .
[which] breeds disrespect for law, and disrespect for law is the corner-stone of revolution.” Report of the
Committee on the Establishment of a Permanent Organization for the Improvement of the Law, ALI
P ROCEEDINGS 1 (1923).
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significantly more to the right, 42 and, as we have seen, a successful progressive movement
can move it through the middle and to the left, though that has not happened often. 43
So what should we make of the last half century of the Supreme Court’s race
decisions, or of its civil rights and civil liberties decisions more broadly? It is possible
that the 1930s, Brown and the 1960s herald a new era, a new paradigm for the Supreme
Court. Or the Court, in the context of distinct popular shifts on basic issues driven by
progressive mass movements, may have taken a new path for two short periods and then
returned to the old pattern. What stands out is those successful progressive movements
that provided the exceptional circumstances in which sustained, systematic protection of
a progressive vision of civil rights and civil liberties became possible – and the lack of
such protection in the absence of such movements. Then in the mid-1970s, the Supreme

42 In the current context, this generally means: corporate and business interests predominate;
labor, safety and environmental protections erode; common interests succumb to the individual interests
of the most powerful; services and benefits provided by government are disfavored; equality fades;
religion rises; the individual rights of people of ordinary means shrink and the rights of the wealthiest
expand, to the extent that, in the current conservative period, money became protected speech. See
Introduction and Freedom of Speech, in The Politics of Law (1998). On speech issues, compare Buckley
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), protecting the right to spend as much money as one wishes and has to
support political speech based on the unprecedented rationale that money is speech – although Congress
had concluded that unrestricted campaign financing was putting elections up for sale and undercutting
democracy – with International Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992), finding
the money people of ordinary means use to support political speech, often raised by requests for donations
from supporters in public places, as unprotected and the inconvenience it may cause to others as a basis
for denying the right to speak. French writer Anatole France captured part of this in THE RED LILY
(1894): “The law, in its majestic equality, forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep under bridges, to
beg in the streets, and to steal bread.” He probably wouldn’t mind if I add: and allows the poor as well as
the rich to spend enormous amounts of money to get their favorite candidates elected.
43 This is an observation considering the whole history of the Supreme Court. It is unsurprising
in the sense that legal systems almost always and everywhere tend to support and preserve traditional
principles, hierarchies and institutions – the status quo – and to resist change. Change that upsets the
status quo by prioritizing common interests and the interests of the majority in the midsection of the
social ladder seems particularly unlikely to be initiated by courts.
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Court returned more or less to the role described by Justice Jackson in 1941.44

44 This may not be a welcome conclusion for many for whom the progressive vision of civil
rights and civil liberties is fundamental. It means that the widespread notion that courts reliably protect
such rights has been a relatively recent illusion, but it does not undercut their meaning or importance.
There will be progressive victories here and there, and larger shifts back and forth, and the contest over
values that goes on in courts is no less important. In that contest, the analysis and conclusions presented
here, although they challenge persistent but baseless allusions to the progressive vision of human rights as
if it started with the founders and was only occasionally interrupted, can be used to emphasize its
importance and to highlight the embarrassing pedigree of much contrary Supreme Court decision-making.
But systemic or meaningful change in a progressive direction, including protection of civil rights as
discussed here, probably requires what I have elsewhere called a revitalization of democracy. This
includes reform of our archaic, unrepresentative and questionably democratic electoral system and a
reconceptualization of democracy in contemporary society, which seem achievable only by progressive
movements. Meaningful democracy should be valued as both a means and an end in itself, and our
history suggests that success will be most likely if fundamental democratic reforms are high on the
agendas of progressive movements seeking a range of other goals, as free speech was high on the agendas
of the labor and civil rights movements (see note 37, supra). The basic electoral reforms are proportional
representation (a system developed after our Constitution and currently used by most democracies that
parcels out power in proportion to electoral strength, and does away with most redistricting and majoritywhite or -black districts); instant runoff voting (so winners have the support of a majority and third-party
votes aren’t “wasted”); removal of barriers to voting and to multiple parties; exclusive government
funding of elections, and limited, free media time as a condition of electronic media licensing; votecounting methods that count all votes and are verifiable; direct election of the president, and perhaps
some form of the virtues of a parliamentary system – ongoing proportional power rather than winnertake-all, change when supported by a large majority, and replacement of a president who has lost such
support. The goal would be to eliminate winner-take-all, plurality (less than majority), money driven,
unrepresentative, votes-selectively-counted, districted-so-incumbents-are-almost-all-guaranteed-reelection elections, to which we have become shockingly accustomed. See Introduction, The Politics of
Law (1998), With Liberty and Justice for Some, at 83-97, 199-211, and other authorities, supra note 1;
David Kairys, Conservative Legal Thought Revisited, 91 Colum L. Rev. 1847 (1991); Why Not
Democracy?, 4 Poverty & Race 13 (1995). On electoral reform, see the website of the Center for Voting
and Democracy, http://www.fairvote.org/. Progressives generally support such measures, but usually
view them as of secondary or minimal importance, although it is hard to envision meaningful or sustained
progressive change without such reforms. There has been some recent interest among constitutional
scholars in less judicial power and more popular power, although usually without serious attention to
electoral reform or to one of the best examples of a mass movement driving constitutional change, the
establishment of free speech as we know it in the 1930s (see note 37, supra). See Larry Kramer, THE
P EOPLE THEMSELVES : POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (Oxford 2004); Jamin
Raskin, OVERRULING DEMOCRACY, THE SUPREME COURT VS.THE AMERICAN P EOPLE (Routledge 2003)
(addressing electoral reform); Mark Tushnet, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS
(Princeton 1999); Bruce Ackerman, WE THE P EOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (Harvard 1998).
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